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JZLint 2.0: New Tool for Analyzing PQC Certificates
MTG and Cryspen Launch JZLint 2.0. Enhanced Tool Supports the Validation of Post-Quantum Certificates and Public Keys.
We’re excited to introduce JZLint 2.0 together with our partner Cryspen. This software tool helps analyze Post-Quantum (PQC) certificates and their public keys – an important step toward ensuring security in a post-quantum world.
JZLint 2.0 enables the so-called linting, i.e., checking certificates for errors and conformance with relevant specifications. This process is a key component in the issuance of digital certificates by public certificate authorities (CAs) that are trusted by common browsers. Certificates must be checked using linting before they are issued to ensure compliance with technical standards and security requirements.
The new version of JZLint extends linting to certificates that use post-quantum cryptographic algorithms. In addition to verifying the formal and technical properties of PQC certificates, the tool places particular emphasis on the quality of the public keys they contain. This in-depth analysis is supported by the library libcrux – a formally verified cryptographic library implemented in Rust and developed by Cryspen.
The importance of such tools is increasing rapidly with the ongoing deployment of PQC certificates. Only recently, the CA/Browser Forum decided to allow post-quantum cryptographic algorithms for certificates used to secure email communication (see: CAB Forum Ballot SMC-013). The use of analysis tools such as JZLint during this transition phase is crucial for identifying potential issues early on, ensuring the reliability of the new cryptographic methods, and promoting their acceptance.
JZLint is an Open Source tool https://github.com/MTG-AG/jzlint and the corresponding command line interface (CLI) can be found at https://mvnrepository.com/artifact/de.mtg/jzlint-cli. The open source cryptography library libcrux is available at https://github.com/cryspen/libcrux.
A scientific study was conducted in collaboration with the University of Regensburg to accompany the development. The publication is available at https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1241 and will be published in the proceedings of the Workshop on Secure Protocol Implementations in the Quantum Era (SPIQE). The slides from the presentation can be found on the SPIQE website.